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What would be the consequence of embracing skepticism about free will 
and/or desert-based moral responsibility?  What if we came to disbelieve 
in moral responsibility?  What would this mean for our interpersonal re-
lationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law?  What would it do 
to our standing as human beings?  Would it cause nihilism and despair 
as some maintain?  Or perhaps increase anti-social behavior as some re-
cent studies have suggested (Vohs and Schooler 2008; Baumeister, Masi-
campo, and DeWall 2009)?  Or would it rather have a humanizing effect 
on our practices and policies, freeing us from the negative effects of what 
Bruce Waller calls the “moral responsibility system” (2014, p. 4)?  These 
questions are of profound pragmatic importance and should be of interest 
independent of the metaphysical debate over free will.  As public procla-
mations of skepticism continue to rise, and as the mass media continues to 
run headlines announcing free will and moral responsibility are illusions,1 
we need to ask what effects this will have on the general public and what 
the responsibility is of professionals.
In recent years a small industry has actually grown up around pre-
cisely these questions.  In the skeptical community, for example, a num-
ber of different positions have been developed and advanced—including 
Saul Smilansky’s illusionism (2000), Thomas Nadelhoffer’s disillusionism 
(2011), Shaun Nichols’ anti-revolution (2007), and the optimistic skepti-
cism of Derk Pereboom (2001, 2013a, 2013b), Bruce Waller (2011), Tam-
ler Sommers (2005, 2007), and others.
Saul Smilansky, for example, maintains that our commonplace beliefs 
in libertarian free will and desert-entailing ultimate moral responsibility 
are illusions,2 but he also maintains that if people were to accept this truth 
there would be wide-reaching negative intrapersonal and interpersonal 
consequences.  According to Smilansky, “Most people not only believe 
in actual possibilities and the ability to transcend circumstances, but have 
distinct and strong beliefs that libertarian free will is a condition for moral 
responsibility, which is in turn a condition for just reward and punish-
ment” (2000, pp. 26-27).  It would be devastating, he warns, if we were to 
destroy such beliefs: “the diffi culties caused by the absence of ultimate-
level grounding are likely to be great, generating acute psychological dis-
comfort for many people and threatening morality—if, that is, we do not 
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have illusion at our disposal” (2000, p. 166).  To avoid any deleterious so-
cial and personal consequences, then, and to prevent the unraveling of our 
moral fabric, Smilansky recommends free will illusionism.  According to 
illusionism, people should be allowed their positive illusion of libertarian 
free will and with it ultimate moral responsibility; we should not take these 
away from people, and those of us who have already been disenchanted 
ought to simply keep the truth to ourselves (see also 2013).
In direct contrast to Smilansky’s illusionism, Thomas Nadelhoffer de-
fends free will disillusionism: “the view that to the extent that folk intu-
itions and beliefs about the nature of human cognition and moral responsi-
bility are mistaken, philosophers and psychologists ought to do their part 
to educate the public—especially when their mistaken beliefs arguably 
fuel a number of unhealthy emotions and attitudes such as revenge, hatred, 
intolerance, lack of empathy, etc.” (2011, p. 184).  According to Nadelhof-
fer, “humanity must get beyond this maladaptive suit of emotions if we 
are to survive.”  And he adds, “To the extent that future developments 
in the sciences of the mind can bring us one step closer to that goal—by 
giving us a newfound appreciation for the limits of human cognition and 
agency—I welcome them with open arms” (2011, p. 184).
A policy of disillusionism is also present in the optimistic skepticisms 
of Derk Pereboom and Bruce Waller.  Derk Pereboom, for example, has 
defended the view that morality, meaning, and value remain intact even if 
we are not morally responsible, and furthermore, that adopting this per-
spective could provide signifi cant benefi ts for our lives.  In Living Without 
Free Will (2001), he argues that life without free will and desert-based 
moral responsibility would not be as destructive as many people believe. 
Prospects of fi nding meaning in life or of sustaining good interpersonal 
relationships, for example, would not be threatened (2001, ch. 7).  And 
although retributivism and severe punishment, such as the death penal-
ty, would be ruled out, preventive detention and rehabilitation programs 
would be justifi ed (2001, 2013).  He even argues that relinquishing our 
belief in desert-based moral responsibility might well improve our well-
being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an 
often destructive form of “moral anger.”
Bruce Waller has also made a strong case for the benefi ts of a world 
without moral responsibility—both in his paper today and elsewhere. 
In his recent book, Against Moral Responsibility (2011), he cites many 
instances in which moral responsibility practices are counterproductive 
from a practical and humanitarian standpoint—notably in how they stifl e 
personal development, encourage punitive excess in criminal justice, and 
perpetuate social and economic inequalities (see Clark, 2012 review). 
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Waller suggests that if we abandon moral responsibility “we can look 
more clearly at the causes and more deeply into the systems that shape 
individuals and their behavior” (2011, p. 287), and this will allow us to 
adopt more humane and effective interpersonal attitudes and approaches 
to education, criminal justice, and social policy.  He maintains that in the 
absence of moral responsibility, “it is possible to look more deeply at the 
infl uences of social systems and situations” (2011, p. 286), to minimize 
the patent unfairness that luck deals out in life, and to “move beyond [the 
harmful effects of] blame and shame” (2011, p. 287).3
Who then is correct?  What would the actual consequences of embrac-
ing skepticism about moral responsibility be?  Here I stand with Bruce 
Waller.  I maintain, like Waller, that belief in moral responsibility, rather 
than being a good thing, actually has a dark side.  I believe Waller does an 
excellent job documenting how belief in moral responsibility, rather than 
protecting rights for the accused, the convicted, or the unfortunate, is too 
often used instead to justify treating them in severe and demeaning ways. 
The problem, I maintain, is the belief that individuals “justly deserve” 
what they get.  The idea of “just deserts”—which is so central to the moral 
responsibility system—is a pernicious one.  For one, it often encourages 
punitive excess in criminal justice—including extreme forms of retribu-
tive justice such as the death penalty.  It is also used, as Waller so aptly 
points out, to perpetuate social and economic inequalities.  The myth of 
the “rugged individual” or the “self-made man” fails to acknowledge the 
important role luck plays in our live.  The simple fact is that what we do, 
and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control. 
We are not (as the moral responsibility system would like us to believe) 
purely or ultimately self-made men and women.4  
Since Waller, in my view, does such an excellent job addressing a 
number of common concerns—e.g., (1) that without moral responsibil-
ity there will be no limit on the harsh treatment meted out, (2) that moral 
responsibility belief is essential for respecting the dignity and worth of 
persons, and (3) that if we deny moral responsibility, then we lose the very 
protections built into the distinction between innocent and guilty—I would 
instead like to use the remainder of my comments to lend additional em-
pirical support to Waller’s central thesis that there is a dark side to belief in 
moral responsibility.  For those not yet convinced that moral responsibility 
skeptics can adequately address these concerns, I here only direct you to 
Waller’s more extended treatment of these issues in Against Moral Re-
sponsibility (2011) as well as the excellent work of Derk Pereboom (2001, 
2013, forthcoming) and Benjamin Vilhauer (e.g., 2009, 2013a, 2013b).
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The Dark Side of Moral Responsibility
Recent fi ndings in moral and political psychology suggest that there may 
be a potential downside to believing in free will and moral responsibility. 
For the sake of this section, I will defi ne free will as “a kind of power or 
ability to make decisions of the sort for which one can be morally re-
sponsible” (Fisher, Kane, Pereboom, and Vargas 2007, p. 1), where moral 
responsibility is understood in the basic desert sense.  While most of the 
empirical work done so far has tended to focus on the potential upside of 
believing in free will (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister, Masicampo, 
and DeWall, 2009),5 a growing body of research has also found some in-
teresting, and potentially troubling, correlations between people’s free will 
beliefs and their other moral, religious, and political beliefs.
For example, recent empirical work by Jasmine Carey and Del Paul-
hus (2013) has found that free will beliefs correlate with religiosity, pu-
nitiveness, and political conservative beliefs and attitudes such as Just 
World Belief (JWB) and Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA).6  They found 
these correlations by administering their The Free Will and Determinism 
Scale known as FAD-Plus (Paulhus and Carey, 2011)—a 27-item scale 
used to measure people’s beliefs and attitudes about free will and related 
concepts—along with measures of religiosity, political conservativism, 
just world beliefs, and right wing authoritarianism.  It’s important here 
to highlight just how worrisome some of these correlations are.  Take, for 
example, a few of the sample items used to validate belief in a just world.
 Just World Belief Scale (JWB) (Lerner, 1980):
o “By and large, people deserve what they get.”
o “Although evil men may hold political power for a while, in 
the general course of history good wins out.”
o “People who meet with misfortune have often brought it on 
themselves.” 
And here are sample items from the Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale:
 The Right Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1996): 
o “The established authorities generally turn out to be right 
about things, while the radicals and protestors are usually just 
‘loud mouths’ showing off their ignorance.” 
o “Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do 
what has to be done to destroy the radical new ways of sinful-
ness that are ruining us.” 
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o “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper au-
thorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy 
rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in 
people’s minds.” 
Many of you, I suspect, will fi nd that these items express troublesome 
(and perhaps even potentially dangerous) ideas.  If you do not, I will try to 
persuade you that you should in a moment. But fi rst it is important to note 
that Carey and Paulhus also found a relationship between beliefs about 
free will and punishment—in particular, they found that believing more 
strongly in free will was correlated with punitiveness.  They found that 
free will believers were more likely to call for harsher criminal punish-
ment in a number of hypothetical scenarios.  As Thomas Nadelhoffer and 
Daniela Goya Tocchetto point out, this is unsurprising: “It makes a priori 
sense that people who believe more strongly in free will would be more 
interested in giving wrongdoers their just deserts” (2013, p. 128).
In addition to the fi ndings of Carey and Paulhus, Nadelhoffer and 
Tocchetto (2013) have also found some troubling correlations.  Using a 
slightly different scale—The Free Will Inventory (FWI), a 29-item tool for 
measuring (a) the strength of people’s beliefs about free will, determinism, 
and dualism, and (b) the relationship between these beliefs and related be-
liefs such as punishment and responsibility (Nadelhoffer et al. in prep)—
Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto found, once again, a correlation between free 
will beliefs and JWB and RWA.  They also found a number of correlations 
between religiosity, conservativism, and political ideology—e.g., Right 
Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) was strongly correlated with political con-
servativism, religiosity, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Just World 
Belief (JWB), and Economic System Justifi cation (ESJ).  And here, “the 
ESJ scale measures the tendency to perceive socioeconomic and political 
arrangements as inherently fair and legitimate—even at the expense of 
individual or group interests,” and the “SDO scale measures the degree of 
adherence to conservative legitimizing myths that attempt to rationalize 
the interests of dominant group members” (Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto, 
2013, p. 132).
These fi ndings, I believe, support Waller’s central claim that where 
belief in free will is strongest, we tend to see increased punitiveness. 
They also appear to support Waller’s claim that “conservative corporatist” 
thinking is generally correlated with an acceptance of economic inequal-
ity and a belief that the world is just and “people deserve what they get.” 
One should not be surprised by these correlations since the link between 
conservative social attitudes and free will belief has long been known (see, 
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e.g., Atemeyer, 1981; Werner, 1993; Jost, 2006; and Baumeister, 2008). 
Robert Atemeyer (1981), for example, has shown that conservatives tend 
to be more blaming and punitive toward lawbreakers.  And John Jost 
(2006) has found that conservatives and liberals tend to make different 
trait attributions for lawbreakers—conservatives draw attributions about 
“sinful” character, whereas liberals point to situational causes. Hence, the 
personal responsibility ethic emphasized by conservatives is fi rmly rooted 
in (and perhaps even necessitates) belief in free will.
To highlight once again the potential danger of belief in free will and 
moral responsibility, let me return to the aforementioned Just World Belief 
(JWB) scale.
The origin of the just world conception can be traced back to 
the original empirical fi ndings of Lerner and Simmons (1966); 
namely, that persons have a tendency to blame the victim of 
misfortunes for their own fate.  Based on these empirical fi nd-
ings, Lerner (1965) formulated the Just World Hypothesis, 
whereby individuals have a need to believe that they live in a 
world where people generally get what they deserve.  In order 
to measure the degree to which persons are willing to believe 
that everyone deserves what happens to them, Lerner (1980) 
developed the JWB scale.  Scores on the scale have been found 
to correlate with the presence of frail religious beliefs (Sorren-
tino and Hardy 1974), and internal (as opposed to an external) 
locus of control, and with the likelihood of derogating inno-
cent victims (Rubin and Peplau 1975).  In addition, people who 
score high on JWB are more likely to trust current institutions 
and authorities, and to blame the poor and praise the rich for 
their respective fates (Jost et al. 2003a). (Nadelhoffer and Toc-
chetto, 2013, p. 132)
For sake of time, I will focus the remainder of my comments on just world 
belief.  I must unfortunately leave aside the Right Wing Authoritarian 
(RWA) scale—but it should be noted that RWA, just like JWB, is associ-
ated with a number of troubling tendencies.  It is typically defi ned in the 
literature in terms of submission to established and legitimate authorities, 
sanctioned general aggressiveness towards various persons, and adherence 
to the generally endorsed social conventions.  “It is also closely related to 
a large set of ego-justifying tendencies that provide support for social ide-
ologies such as intolerance of ambiguity, dogmatism, terror management, 
uncertainty avoidance, and need for cognitive closure” (Nadelhoffer and 
Tocchetto, 2013, p. 131).
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So what’s so dangerous about just world belief?  Well, belief in a just 
world (which, again, has been shown to be correlated with belief in free 
will) is a blame-the-victim approach.  It promotes the idea that “people 
deserve what they get” and “people who meet with misfortune have often 
brought it on themselves.”  We can see evidence of just world belief in the 
unfortunate tendency, both among ordinary folk and the legal system, to 
blame rape victims for the circumstances.  As Waller has elsewhere writ-
ten:
When we cannot easily and effectively help innocent victims 
then our belief in a just world is severely threatened, and the 
most convenient and common way of preserving that belief is 
to change the status of the victim from innocent to guilty.  The 
case of rape victims is the most obvious and extensively studies 
example of this phenomenon.  Rape is a brutal, demeaning, and 
trauma-producing crime; in a just world, no innocent person 
would be subjected to such a horrifi c fate.  Thus there is a pow-
erful tendency to see rape victims as really not quite so inno-
cent: they dress provocatively; they were “loose” women; they 
did something to put themselves in that situation (they were 
careless about where they walked, or they drank too much); 
they “led him on” or were “asking for it” (thus in some parts of 
the world, rape victims are subject to death by stoning).  Harsh 
cross-examination of those who claim to be rape victims are 
notoriously common; those harsh cross-examinations are com-
mon because they are often effective; and they are often ef-
fective because juries—eager to preserve their belief in a just 
world—are already inclined to see the victim of this terrible 
ordeal as other than innocent. (2013, p. 73)
This is just one unfortunate example of the pernicious nature of belief in 
a just world.  Other examples include blaming those in poverty for their 
own circumstances, viewing criminals as “deserving what they get,” label-
ing those on welfare as “lazy” and “mooches,” and blaming educational 
inequity on the parents and children themselves—since, of course, if the 
world is just, then people must have brought these circumstances upon 
themselves.  This blaming of victims (in defense of belief in a just world) 
has been established by numerous studies, including studies showing that 
the stronger the belief in a just world the greater the likelihood of blaming 
victims for their unfortunate fates (Wagstaff, 1983; Furnham and Gunter, 
1984; Harper and Manasse, 1992; Dalbert and Yamauchi, 1994; Montada, 
1998).
We all know, however, (at least in our more rationally self-refl ective 
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moments) that the world is not just and the lottery of life is not always fair. 
We need to admit that luck plays a big role in what we do and the way we 
are.  As Nietzsche long-ago wrote:
The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been con-
ceived so far; it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic.  But 
the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself 
profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense.  The desire 
for “freedom of the will” in the superlative metaphysical sense, 
which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-
educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibil-
ity for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, 
ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be 
precisely this causa sui and, with more than Baron Munchhau-
sen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out 
of the swamps of nothingness. (1992, pp. 218-19)
It’s my proposal that we do away with the myth of the “rugged individual,” 
the “self-made man,” the causa sui.  If what I have argued here is correct, 
these conceptions (along with the beliefs in free will and moral responsi-
bility) are intimately connected with a number of other potentially harm-
ful beliefs—e.g., just world belief (JWB) and right wing authoritarianism 
(RWA).  It’s time that we leave these antiquated notions behind, lose our 
moral anger, stop blaming the victim, and turn our attention to the diffi cult 
task of addressing the causes that lead to criminality, poverty, wealth-
inequality, and educational inequity.
Conclusion
To conclude, then, I agree with Waller that belief in moral responsibility is 
not a protector of rights for the accused, the convicted, or the unfortunate, 
but is instead used, quite often, to justify treating them in severe and de-
meaning ways.  To help aid Waller’s case, I have introduced and discussed 
some recent fi ndings in moral and political psychology.  These fi ndings, I 
have argued, point to the potential dark side of belief in free will and moral 
responsibility.  While I have not attempted to make the case for skepticism 
about free will and moral responsibility here—although I have made the 
case elsewhere (Caruso, 2012)—we should at least conclude that there are 
good reasons to doubt the putative pragmatic benefi ts of believing in free 
will and desert-based moral responsibility.
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Notes
1 Here are just two recent examples of such headlines: “Free Will is an 
Illusion,” The Chronicle Review (March 23, 2012); and “Scientists Say Free Will 
Probably Doesn’t Exist…,” Scientifi c American (April 6, 2010). 
2 While Saul Smilansky maintains a skepticism about our purportedly 
commonplace belief in libertarian free will and desert-based moral responsi-
bility, his Fundamental Dualism also acknowledges that certain compatibil-
ist insights are true. As Smilansky describes his position: “I agree with hard 
determinists that the absence of libertarian free will is a grave matter, which 
ought radically to change our understanding of ourselves, of morality, and of 
justice. But I also agree with the compatibilists that it makes sense to speak 
about ideas such as moral responsibility and desert, even without libertarian free 
will (and without recourse to a reductionist transformation of these notions along 
consequentialist lines). In a nutshell,...‘forms of life’ based on the compatibilist 
distinctions about control are possible and morally required, but are also super-
fi cial and deeply problematic in ethical and personal terms” (2000, p. 5; see also 
2013).   
3 According to Waller, “Blaming individuals and holding people morally 
responsible...is not an effective way of making either systems or people better; 
instead, it is a design for hiding small problems until they grow into larger ones 
and a design for concealing system shortcomings by blaming problems on indi-
vidual failure. If we want to promote effective attention to the causes and cor-
rection of mistakes and the developments of more effective behavior and more 
reliable systems, then we must move away from the model of individual blame 
and instead encourage an open inquiry into mistakes and their causes and into 
how a system can be devised to prevent such mistakes and improve individual 
behavior” (2011, p. 291).
4 For moral responsibility skeptics like myself, this means we are never 
morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that 
would make us truly deserving of blame or praise. This is not to say that there 
are not other conceptions of responsibility that can be reconciled with determin-
ism, chance, or luck. Nor is it to deny that there are good pragmatic reasons to 
maintain certain systems of punishment and reward. Rather, it is to insist that 
to hold people truly or ultimately morally responsible for their actions—i.e., to 
hold them responsible in the non-consequentialist desert-based sense—would 
be to hold them responsible for the results of the morally arbitrary, for what is 
ultimately beyond their control, which is (at least on my view) fundamentally 
unfair and unjust (Caruso, 2012 and 2013).
5 For a good criticism of these fi ndings, see Miles (2011) and Summers 
(2008).
6 Many of the fi ndings reported in this section were fi rst brought to my 
attention by Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto (2013).
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